

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 225618
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:NEA:JCOLLINS
APPROVED BY:NEA:JCOLLINS
S/S-O:SVELARGA

-----127982 070301Z /70

R 061754Z SEP 78 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0000

S E C R E T STATE 225618

NODIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT JIDDA 6410 ACTION SECSTATE INFO WHITE HOUSE
DATED SEP 03:

QTE: S E C R E T JIDDA 6410

EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR, SA, US
SUBJ: COMMENTS ON LATEST LETTER FROM KING KHALID TO PRESIDENT
CARTER ON CAMP DAVID SUMMIT

REF: JIDDA 6340

1. SUMMARY: ABD AL-RAHMAN MANSOURI CAME TO THE EMBASSY TODAY
AND DELIVERED AN UNSIGNED, UNDATED LETTER FROM THE KING TO
THE PRESIDENT (LETTER NOW BEING TRANSLATED AND TRANSMITTED
BY SEPTTEL). MANSOURI, IN COMMENTING ON LETTER OF WHICH HE
HAD HAND IN DRAFTING, SAID ITS PURPOSE WAS TO EMPHASIZE FURTHER
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 225618

THAT SAUDI ARABIA'S CREDIBILITY AND PRESTIGE WERE AT STAKE ON
RESULTS OF CAMP DAVID; THAT SUCCESS OR FAILURE THERE WOULD
DETERMINE WHETHER MODERATES OR RADICALS PREVAILED IN ARAB
WORLD, AND FOR THAT REASON SAUDIS WERE MOST CONCERNED ABOUT
OUTCOME. MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR NON-FAILURE OF SUMMIT WOULD BE
FIRM REITERATION OF U.S. POSITION ON TWO BASIC POINTS: WITHDRAWAL
AND PALESTINIAN SOLUTION. LETTER POSSIBLY RESULTS FROM

SAUDIS ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION THAT PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO KINO DATED AUGUST 15 WAS REPLY TO KING'S LETTER DATED AUGUST 14, WHICH CROSSED IN DELIVERY. IF THIS ASSUMPTION IS CORRECT (AND WE BELIEVE IT IS), THEN SAUDIS FELT KING'S FIRST LETTER HAD NOT BEEN ANSWERED IN A SUFFICIENTLY RESPONSIVE MANNER; HENCE THE FOLLOW-UP EPISTLE. END SUMMARY.

2. ABD AL-RAHMAN MANSOURI, UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, CALLED THIS MORNING AND SAID HE HAD A LETTER FROM THE KING TO THE PRESIDENT AND HE WOULD BRING IT TO THE EMBASSY IF I WOULD BE AVAILABLE. SINCE RAMADAN ENDED LAST NIGHT AND TODAY IS A UNIVERSAL ARAB HOLIDAY, I COMMENTED THAT I WAS SURPRISED TO FIND HIM WORKING. HE REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH THE OFFICIAL HOLIDAYS BEGAN 29 AUGUST, HE HAD BEEN WORKING EACH DAY BUT WAS LEAVING FOR MECCA IN A SHORT WHILE.

3. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON LEBANON (SEPTEL), HE PRODUCED A LETTER IN ARABIC AND ASKED IF I WOULD LIKE HIM TO GIVE A QUICK BUT ROUGH TRANSLATION. I REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY.

4. THE LETTER BEING LENGTHY, SOMEWHAT RAMBLING AND THE TRANSLATION AT TIMES HARD TO FOLLOW, I ASKED MANSOURI AT ITS CONCLUSION JUST WHAT ITS REAL PURPOSE AND MEANING WERE.
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 225618

5. HE REPLIED THAT SAUDI ARABIA'S CREDIBILITY AND POSITION OF LEADERSHIP IN THE ARAB WORLD DEPENDED ON THE SUCCESS OF THE CAMP DAVID SUMMIT. HE RECALLED THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SUMMIT, THE KING HAD SENT PRINCE TURKI AL-FAISAL TO JORDAN, SYRIA AND IRAQ AND HAD DISPATCHED HIM (MANSOURI) TO FIVE GULF STATES, ALL FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING UNIFIED ARAB SUPPORT FOR CAMP DAVID. SAG ALSO INVITED ARAFAT TO COME HERE TO DISCUSS PLO SUPPORT.

6. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS A UNANIMOUSLY PESSIMISTIC VIEW ON THE PART OF ALL OF THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS VISITED. HOWEVER, ALL EXCEPT KUWAIT AGREED TO WITHHOLD JUDGMENT UNTIL AFTER THE SUMMIT, PRIMARILY BECAUSE SAUDI ARABIA WAS REQUESTING THEM TO DO SO. HE SAID THEY WERE ALSO ABLE TO GET AGREEMENT THAT THE ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AT THE ARAB LEAGUE MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 12.

7. IN AN INTERESTING COMMENTARY ON KUWAIT, MANSOURI REPORTED THAT ON THE DAY PRECEDING HIS ARRIVAL, THE KUWAITIS RELEASED A STATEMENT CONDEMNING CAMP DAVID, WHICH HE FELT

WAS DELIBERATE IN THAT THEY KNEW HIS PURPOSE IN COMING. IN AN HOUR'S MEETING WITH AMIR SABAH, HE SAID SABAH'S CONDEMNATION OF THE U.S. WAS QUITE EXTENSIVE AND SOMEWHAT BITTER. THE KUWAIT LEADER CASTIGATED THE U.S. AS BEING COMPLETELY UNTRUSTWORTHY AND RIDICULED SAUDI ARABIA FOR ITS CONTINUED FRIENDSHIP WITH AND RELIANCE ON THE U.S. HE POINTED OUT, ACCORDING TO MANSOURI, HOW THE U.S. HAD "LET DOWN THE MODERATE ARABS" IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, ESPECIALLY IN SOMALIA, AND MORE RECENTLY IN AFGHANISTAN. HE CITED THE HISTORY OF USG FOREIGN POLICY SINCE ITS EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM AS PROOF OF UNRELIABILITY OF USG'S FOREIGN POLICIES COMMITMENTS.

8. MANSOURI THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT ALL OF THE ARAB
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 225618

WORLD WAS LOOKING AT CAMP DAVID AS A TURNING POINT IN THE MIDEAST. SUCCESS AT CAMP DAVID WOULD GIVE SUPPORT AND MOMENTUM TO THE MODERATES AND WOULD BE DEFINITELY DISCOURAGING TO THE SOVIETS IN THEIR ASPIRATIONS IN THE AREA. ON THE OTHER HAND, A FAILURE AT CAMP DAVID WOULD GIVE SIMILAR ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE RADICALS, BAATHISTS AND REJECTIONISTS AND THE SOVIET ALLIES AND MAKE THE MODERATE POSITION OF A COUNTRY LIKE SAUDI ARABIA ULTIMATELY UNTENABLE HE STATED THAT SADAT, IF HE SURVIVED, WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A NEW APPROACH AND SAUDI ARABIA COULD NOT STAND ALONE IN THE ARAB WORLD BUT WOULD HAVE TO JOIN ITS ARAB BROTHERS. HIS REFERENCE HERE WAS NOT CLEAR BUT HE MENTIONED THAT THIS MIGHT WELL MEAN ANOTHER MIDEAST WAR. WE GATHERED FROM HIS COMMENTS AND FROM THE MESSAGE SAUDI ARABIA WOULD HAVE TO GIVE ITS FULL POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO THE ARAB CAUSE.

9. I ASKED HIM AT THAT POINT WHAT WAS THE MINIMUM EXPECTED FROM CAMP DAVID IN ORDER THAT THE MODERATE ARAB STATES WOULD NOT LOSE GROUND. HE REPLIED THAT THE MINIMUM WOULD BE A USG REAFFIRMATION OF ISRAEL'S RETURNING TO ITS 1967 BORDERS AND A PALESTINIAN HOMELAND WITH SELF DETERMINATION. ANYTHING LESS THAN THAT WOULD BE A DISASTER, ACCORDING TO MANSOURI.

10. I TOLD HIM THAT I KNEW THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY APPRECIATED THE TREMENDOUS EFFORT WHICH SAUDI ARABIA WAS MAKING TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF CAMP DAVID; THAT I HAD BEEN REQUESTED TO MAKE SURE THAT I KNEW WHERE CROWN PRINCE FAHD COULD BE LOCATED ON SHORT NOTICE DURING THE SUMMIT AS SOME QUESTIONS MAY ARISE ON WHICH WE NEEDED HIS AND SAG'S ADVICE AND JUDGMENT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 225618

11. HE STATED THAT PRINCE FAHD WOULD EITHER BE IN TAIF OR JIDDA UNTIL AFTER THE EID HOLIDAY.

12. COMMENT: THERE HAS PROBABLY BEEN SOME CONFUSION IN THE MINDS OF SAG ABOUT THE AUGUST 15 LETTER OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE KING. AMBASSADOR ALIREZA STATED TO ME IN A MEETING 31 AUGUST THAT SAG WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE PRESIDENT'S ANSWER TO THE KING'S LETTER ABOUT CAMP DAVID AND THAT ANOTHER LETTER WAS FORTHCOMING. I REPLIED TO HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT ANSWERED, TO MY KNOWLEDGE, THE KING'S LETTER ABOUT THE SUMMIT AS HE HAD BEEN ON VACATION.

13. A REVIEW OF THE CHRONOLOGY AND CONTENT OF THE MESSAGES INDICATES THE REASON FOR THIS MISUNDERSTANDING. THE KING'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT IS DATED AUGUST 14 AND WAS TRANSMITTED BY THE EMBASSY ON AUGUST 15. THE LETTER OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE KING EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR HIS PRESS STATEMENT OF AUGUST 11 IN SUPPORT OF CAMP DAVID WAS RECEIVED HERE ON AUGUST 15 AFTER THE KING'S LETTER HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED. THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER IN TURN WAS GIVEN TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND WAS PROBABLY CONSIDERED BY THEM TO BE ANSWER TO THE KING'S LETTER, OVERLOOKING THE REFERENCE TO AUGUST 11 STATEMENT IN FIRST PARAGRAPH.

14. BECAUSE OF THIS APPARENT CONFUSION, WE RECOMMEND AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE TWO LETTERS, POINTING OUT THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF AUGUST 15 WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE AN ANSWER TO THE KING'S LETTER OF AUGUST 14. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO CONTENT, SEE PARA 3, REFTEL.
WEST UNQTE
CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: KING, PRESIDENT, TEXT, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, CAT-B, SUMMIT MEETINGS, NEGOTIATIONS, PEACE TALKS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 06 sep 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE225618
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: NEA:JCOLLINS
Enclosure: REPEAT OF JIDDA 6410
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: N780007-0461
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 2
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780997/aaaadchx.tel
Line Count: 208
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: f46dfa56-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 78 JIDDA 6340
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1529035
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: COMMENTS ON LATEST LETTER FROM KING KHALID TO PRESIDENT CARTER ON CAMP DAVID SUMMIT
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, PDIP, PPDC, SA, US, YE, XF, (CARTER, JIMMY), (SAUD, KHALID IBN ADB AL-AZIZ AL)
To: KUWAIT
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/f46dfa56-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014